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1. Introduction 
The Asymmetry in the ethics of procreation consists of two distinct ethical claims. The 
first is that it is morally wrong to bring into existence a child who will have an abjectly miserable 
life; the second is that it is permissible not to bring into existence a child who will enjoy a very 
happy life.
1
 Both claims of the Asymmetry are supported by strong moral intuitions, but finding 
a plausible moral theory which can accommodate both claims has proven a difficult task. In fact, 
the inability to provide coherent theoretical support for the Asymmetry has led some authors to 
reject it (e.g., McMahan 2009, Persson 2009, Singer 1993). Other philosophers have posed 
creative, though controversial, ways of vindicating this view (e.g., Benatar 2006, esp. pp. 32-34; 
Roberts 2011b). 
In this paper, I distinguish between two variations of the Asymmetry. The first is the 
Abstract Asymmetry, the idealized variation of the Asymmetry that many philosophers have 
been trying to solve. The second is the Real-World Asymmetry, a non-idealized variation that 
applies explicitly to cases of ordinary human reproduction. I argue that the Real-World 
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 McMahan (1981, p. 100) was the first to give this union of claims this title, and most other philosophers 
have followed his lead when referring to this issue. 
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Asymmetry can be defended by properly acknowledging the general wrongness of causing 
someone else to suffer, the limits of what morality can reasonably demand of us, and the 
significance of respecting women’s autonomy. I then argue that the Abstract Asymmetry, which 
is idealized in ways that eliminate the import of morality’s demandingness and respect for 
women’s autonomy, is indefensible. We lack good reason to think our intuitions underlying the 
Abstract Asymmetry are reliable, and the Abstract Asymmetry also conflicts with a plausible 
moral principle. 
 
2. Distinguishing Two Asymmetries 
I have already described the Asymmetry in broad terms, but it is actually ambiguous 
between two different sets of claims. Here is the first set of claims, as described by Melinda 
Roberts (2011a, p. 765): 
Claim 1: It would be wrong to bring a miserable child – a child whose life is less than worth 
living – into existence.  
Claim 2: It would be permissible not to bring a happy child – a child whose life is worth living 
or even well worth living – into existence. 
These claims are illuminated more explicitly in the graph below: 
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Claim 1: Act a1 is morally wrong. Claim 2: Act a3 is morally permissible. 
Figure 1: The Asymmetry
2
 
In Figure 1, we have two procreative choices to make. We are choosing whether or not to bring 
Meg into existence (shown in worlds w1 and w2), and we are choosing whether or not to bring 
Hans into existence. In the graph, Meg and Hans only exist in the worlds where their names are 
bolded, and the choices of whether to bring them into existence are independent from one 
another (i.e., Meg’s existence or nonexistence has no impact on Hans and vice-versa). If Meg 
were to come into existence, she would have a dreadful life characterized by great and persistent 
suffering. In contrast, if Hans were to come into existence, he would have one of the best lives 
possible. It would be wrong to perform act a1: we ought not to bring Meg into existence. In 
contrast, it would be permissible to perform act a3: we may permissibly choose not to bring Hans 
into existence. The central puzzle of the Asymmetry is how we can explain why act a1 is 
obligatory while act a3 is not. 
But there is something peculiar about this presentation of the Asymmetry. Meg and Hans 
are the only individuals affected by their coming into existence; no one else’s welfare is altered. 
It is as if we are to imagine pushing buttons regarding which world we bring about: the 
corresponding person simply pops into existence with a home, an education, and a suitable job.
3
 
Obviously, this thought experiment is much different than the actual process of conceiving and 
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 This graph is adapted from Roberts (2011a, p. 766; 2011b, p. 345) She assumes that we can compare the 
welfare of those who exist with those who do not exist and represents nonexistence with a welfare level of 
0. This claim is controversial (Feldman 1991, Holtug 2001, Roberts 2003), but for the purposes of 
graphing the asymmetry, I consider it an acceptable assumption. 
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Melinda Roberts presented the choice to bring Hans into existence in this manner when she discussed 
the Asymmetry during an invited lecture at the University of Tennessee.  
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raising a child, which requires substantial long-term investments of physical and emotional 
energy – especially for women, since they are the ones who gestate children. 
Let us call the Asymmetry portrayed by the union of Claims 1 and 2 (and depicted in 
Roberts’ graph) the Abstract Asymmetry. Given its idealized nature, the Abstract Asymmetry can 
be contrasted with another Asymmetry, which I represent as the union of Claims 3 and 4: 
Claim 3: Under ordinary conditions of human reproduction, people are not morally permitted 
to bring a child into existence who would have an abjectly miserable life. 
Claim 4: Under ordinary conditions of human reproduction, people are not morally obligated to 
bring a child into existence who would have a very happy life.   
Since Claims 3 and 4 are explicitly grounded in the conditions of typical human reproduction, 
call their union the Real-World Asymmetry. Also notice that both claims in the Real-World 
Asymmetry leave open the possibility that there can be extreme circumstances where we are 
obligated to perform these actions, such as if the only way to save the world were to bring a child 
into existence who would live a miserable life or if procreation were required for the 
continuation of the human species.
4
 If we wish to defend the view that presently living human 
couples should refrain from bringing into existence children that would live miserable lives but 
are not similarly obligated to conceive and raise children who would live happy lives, then 
affirming Claims 3 and 4 are sufficient: we do not need to defend the Abstract Asymmetry to 
secure this result.  
Now the pivotal question emerges: can we secure the Real-World Asymmetry? 
Moreover, can we secure it more easily than the Abstract Asymmetry? We can start by trying to 
get the Real-World Asymmetry in hand. 
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 A duty to procreate might not be limited to such extreme scenarios. Saul Smilansky (1995, pp. 46-48) 
offers eight distinct reasons that might give rise to an obligation to procreate. 
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3. Securing the Real-World Asymmetry 
To secure the Real-World Asymmetry, we can appeal to three fairly basic ethical 
principles. We will begin with Claim 3. This principle is well-supported by the general moral 
duty to avoid causing suffering. It is morally bad that people suffer, and prima facie we ought 
not to cause other people to suffer if we can avoid doing so. Moreover, in the circumstances 
specified by Claim 3, the suffering of the child would be extremely bad. Thus, a child should 
only be forced to endure this kind of life in desperate and outlandish circumstances. 
Securing Claim 3 is straightforward, but securing Claim 4 is more challenging. If a 
person’s suffering is a strong moral reason not to bring a person into existence, then why would a 
person’s happiness not be a strong moral reason in favor of bringing a person into existence? It 
seems very difficult to deny that the creation of person with a happy life is a morally good thing. 
This fact alone – the fact that an action makes the world a better place in some way – appears to 
provide a moral reason to perform that action. But if that is correct, then one fears that people 
will frequently have a moral obligation to have children. So how can Claim 4 be supported? 
There are two promising routes to securing Claim 4. The first stems from the recognition 
that morality does not demand that we always perform the action that maximizes the good. After 
all, there are some actions, even in the realm of procreation, that are supererogatory – morally 
good to do but not morally required. Judith Thompson (1971, pp. 48-49) provided a famous 
example of such a case more than 40 years ago. Suppose you wake up to discover that you are 
strapped to a famous violinist who has a fatal kidney ailment. You were kidnapped during the 
night by the Society of Music Lovers, and because you are the only one who matches the 
violinist’s blood type, the violinist’s circulatory system is now connected to yours so that the 
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violinist may make use of your kidneys. The violinist must remain connected for nine months to 
recover; then he can be safely disconnected. In critically reflecting on this case, almost everyone 
agrees that it would be permissible for you to disconnect yourself from the violinist even though 
the benefit to him and the Society of Music Lovers would vastly outweigh the burdens you must 
endure for nine months. One of the central reasons for thinking that it is permissible to 
disconnect from the violinist is that there are limits to what morality can demand of us: there are 
certain situations where we can sensibly say that an action would be a morally good thing to do 
but that we cannot be required to do it. 
  Bringing the happy child into existence might be a good thing to do, but it cannot be 
required of anyone. The responsibilities and burdens associated with childbirth and parenting are 
among the greatest and most demanding that a person can experience in her lifetime. Pregnancy 
can be the most physically and emotionally challenging experience of a woman’s life and 
frequently affects her physical appearance for the remainder of her life. Caring for children is no 
easy task either. The investments of time, emotion, and financial resources required to be a good 
parent are extraordinary. They are also enduring: children do not typically leave their parents’ 
care until they are close to twenty years old. Burdens this significant and this long-lasting cannot 
be required of anyone. While many happily embrace these duties and find the rewards of 
parenting far greater than the burdens, we must not force people to bear such burdens when they 
do not want to endure them. 
Some philosophers resist this burden-based defense of Claim 4. David Benatar (2006), 
for example, argues that this defense is unsatisfactory because “it implies in the absence of this 
sacrifice we would have a duty to bring happy people into existence. In other words, it would be 
wrong not to create such people if we could create them without great cost to ourselves” (p. 33). 
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Benatar is right about this implication but wrong to think it problematic. If the ways in which we 
were born and developed into adults were radically different (such that they did not impose these 
costs on us), then it’s quite reasonable to suppose that our duties with regard to reproduction and 
parenting would be very different. Drastically changing a morally salient factor in a particular 
case will often affect our evaluation of that case. This result should not bother us because all 
instances of procreation in fact do involve substantial costs that someone must bear. 
A further response to Benatar’s objection stems from an important observation related to 
these costs: women typically bear more of the reproductive costs than men. Some of these costs 
are physical – the result of differences in male and female biology. Others are culturally 
enforced: women are still generally expected to bear more of the responsibilities of childcare 
than men in most of the world. Thus, proper concern for gender equity and respect for women’s 
autonomy also generates strong support for Claim 4. An obligation to produce as many happy 
children as possible would force many women to live lives devoted almost entirely to 
reproduction; they would lack the freedom to pursue any other ambitions or goals (Overall 2012, 
pp. 73-75). Such an outcome is morally unacceptable even if the happiness of the children 
outweighed the suffering and inconvenience of the women who gestated (and likely raised) all 
these children. 
We now see how the Real-World Asymmetry can be vindicated. Claim 3 can be 
supported by a general duty to avoid causing suffering. Claim 4 can be supported by 
acknowledging that even though increasing overall happiness is a moral reason to perform an 
action, other factors – namely, the burdens associated with gestating and raising children and the 
importance of respecting women’s autonomy – outweigh this consideration in the case of 
reproduction. 
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However, we should reflect a bit more on the sentiment underlying Benatar’s objection. 
Perhaps the true worry is that intuitively the Real-World Asymmetry is not strong enough to 
capture our deepest convictions about the ethics of reproduction. Other philosophers have 
expressed a similar concern. Roberts (2011b) suggests not only that the Abstract Asymmetry is 
highly intuitive but also that Claims 1 and 2 might be “important constraints on any adequate 
moral theory” (p. 2). Similarly, McMahan (2002) claims that the Abstract Asymmetry is “deeply 
intuitive and probably impossible to dislodge” (p. 300). Despite these protests, I argue in the next 
section that the Abstract Asymmetry must be rejected. 
 
6. Abandoning the Abstract Asymmetry 
The primary support for the Abstract Asymmetry is an intuition that some philosophers 
claim to hold quite deeply. When we consider the details of the Abstract Asymmetry, however, it 
is difficult to understand why these intuitions are so deeply held. The Abstract Asymmetry is, as 
I mentioned earlier, a case of procreation in a vacuum. Referring back to Figure 1, worlds w1 
and w2 are identical except that Meg exists with -100 welfare in w1 and does not exist in w2, 
and worlds w3 and w4 are identical except that Hans exists in w4 with +100 welfare and does 
not exist in w3. Everything else in these worlds remains unaffected by Meg and Hans’ existence 
or nonexistence. Given these idealized circumstances, how could anyone have a clear intuition 
about what our reproductive obligations are? No human being has ever witnessed or experienced 
a case of genuinely costless procreation, so it is neither realistic nor sensible to think that we 
could have fine-tuned, reliable intuitions about this kind of reproduction. As a result, we should 
be suspicious of our intuitions about the Abstract Asymmetry and not hesitate to revise them in 
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the presence of a good reason to reject it. Moreover, I believe there is at least one good reason to 
reject the Abstract Asymmetry. 
Claim 2 of the Abstract Asymmetry – which states that there is no obligation to bring 
Hans into existence – is false because it violates this moral principle: 
Goodness for Free: If we can perform an action that causes something good to happen 
without sacrificing anything at all, we are morally obligated to perform that action.  
Since virtually every moral decision we make involves some moral or non-moral costs, this 
principle is almost never applicable to ordinary moral decisions. However, it is applicable to 
Claim 2. We can bring Hans into existence at no costs, moral or otherwise, to ourselves or 
anyone else. Given that Hans would have an extremely happy life, bringing him into existence 
would be a morally good thing to do. That an action causes something good to happen surely 
counts as a morally salient reason to perform that action. That reason can be overridden by other 
considerations (such as the two I mentioned in discussion of Claim 4), but the Abstract 
Asymmetry is deliberately constructed so as to eliminate all other morally relevant 
considerations. Thus, defenders of Claim 2 do not have a countervailing reason that they can 
offer for not bringing Hans into existence. We are left with a morally salient reason to bring 
Hans into existence and no reasons at all not to bring him into existence. Thus, consistent with 
Goodness for Free, we are obligated to bring Hans into existence under the conditions specified 
by the Abstract Asymmetry. 
By abstracting away from the real-world conditions of reproduction, defenders of the 
Abstract Asymmetry have inadvertently made Claim 2 indefensible. The only apparent support 
that can be offered for it is an appeal to intuitions, and these intuitions concern a case utterly 
unfamiliar to us – one far different from ordinary human reproduction. Even assuming that moral 
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intuitions are useful as starting points for ethical inquiry and that they might sometimes serve as 
appropriate checks on whether a theory generates plausible answers cases, we cannot rely on 
moral intuitions alone when we encounter realms of ethical thought that are unfamiliar to us. Our 
intuitions are clearest and most reliable regarding situations that manifest frequently in the world 
around us and invite our introspection. But a case of procreation that does not have any impact 
on anyone else in the world is in no way this kind of scenario. Thus, it is unsurprising that our 
intuitions about it go awry. 
 
Conclusion 
I have argued that the Abstract Asymmetry, which has been the subject of much 
philosophical discussion, should be rejected. Fortunately, there is a less idealized set of claims, 
which constitute the Real-World Asymmetry, that can be secured rather easily. These claims are 
sufficient to establish that, in nearly all cases of ordinary human reproduction, it is wrong to 
bring a child into existence who would have a miserable life but not obligatory to bring a child 
into existence who would have a happy life. This Asymmetry is not the one that every 
philosopher intuitively desires, but it must suffice: its abstract counterpart is indefensible.   
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